



# The new Landscape of Cyber Threats and the European Cyber Security Challenge

**Systems Security Laboratory** (<http://ssl.ds.unipi.gr/>)


*Member of the European Cyber Security Challenge Steering Committee*

**Department of Digital Systems, University of Piraeus**

Associate Professor Christos Xenakis




# Breaches



In the last **8** years more than **7.1 billion** identities have been exposed in data breaches

# Email threats, malware, and bots





## The underground marketplace



Ransomware toolkit

\$10 – \$1,800



DDoS short duration (< 1 hr)

\$5 – \$20



Documents (Passports, utility bills)

\$1 – \$3



Android banking Trojan

\$200



Credit cards

\$0.5 – \$30



Cloud service account

\$6 – \$10



Gift card

20% – 40% (of face value)



Cash-out service

10% – 20% (of acct. value)

Where everything has a price

# Web

Percentage of scanned websites with vulnerabilities

2014

76%

2015

78%

2016

76%

Percentage of which were critical

20%

15%

9%


Average number of web attacks blocked per day

2015

340K

2016


229K




← Zero-day vulnerabilities

# Mobile vulnerabilities reported, by operating system

Android surpassed iOS in terms of the number of mobile vulnerabilities reported in 2016.





Number of mobile malware detection →




# Ransomwares

# of infection per month



Total number of infection per year ➔





# Shodan: The IoT search engine for watching sleeping kids and bedroom antics

[Opinion] Shodan is not the devil, but rather a messenger which should make us take responsibility for our own security in a world of webcams and mobile devices.



By [Charlie Osborne](#) for [Zero Day](#) | January 26, 2016 -- 11:43 GMT (11:43 GMT) | Topic: [Security](#)

## The most shocking of Shodan

[SEE FULL GALLERY](#)




## The most shocking of Shodan

[SEE FULL GALLERY](#)








#### TOTAL RESULTS

2,833

#### TOP COUNTRIES



United States	766
Korea, Republic of	295
Germany	199
Russian Federation	111
Canada	95

#### TOP SERVICES

HTTP (8080)	1,132
8081	618
HTTPS	218
HTTP	166
AndroMouse	28

#### RELATED TAGS:

**82.76.209.232**

82-76-209-232.rdsnet.ro

**RCS & RDS Business**

Added on 2018-02-18 07:3

Romania, Bucharest

[Details](#)

**66.247.207.65**

66-247-207-65.setardsl.aw

**Sibh/setar Aruba**

Added on 2018-02-18 07:38:27 GMT

Aruba, Oranjestad

[Details](#)

#### IP Webcam

46.250.18.234

46.250.18.234.pool.breezein.net

**Docusis broadband**

Added on 2018-02-18 06:58:14 GMT

Ukraine, Odessa

Technologies:

[Details](#)

# Internet of Things




Speed of attack

**2 minutes:**  
time it takes for  
an IoT device to  
be attacked





# SCADA

- In **2016** attacks have been reported in **Israel, Turkey & Finland**
- In **2015** a malware in **Ukraine** trigger an **hours-long blackout** affecting about **80,000 people**



**“Every component in the grid that has become digitized is becoming an attack point”**

## Vulnerabilities discovered in ICS



**85.10.88.37**

eu85-10-88-37.adsl.euphony.net.be  
**Euphony Benelux n.v.**  
Added on 2018-02-18 06:51:15 GMT  
🇧🇪 Belgium  
[Details](#)

HTTP/1.1 307 Temporary Redirect  
Server: CirCarLife **Scada** v4.2.4  
Connection: keep-alive  
Date: Sun, 18 Feb 2018 6:43:14 GMT  
Content-Length: 0  
Location: html/setup.html

**85.96.189.101**

85.96.189.101.dynamic.ttnet.com.tr  
**Turk Telekom**  
Added on 2018-02-18 06:38:27 GMT  
🇹🇷 Turkey, Bandirma  
[Details](#)

HTTP/1.1 200 OK  
Cache-Control: private  
Content-Length: 8472  
Content-Type: text/html  
Server: Microsoft-IIS/7.5  
Set-Cookie: ASPSESSIONIDSAQBQTCB=ICFJICIAOLKKCAOLJAGGELA; path=/  
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET  
Date: Sun, 18 Feb 2018 06:38:26 GMT

# Cellular Networks





Figure 2. Determining a subscriber's location



80 Infocom Security  
Figure 4. Intercept incoming SMS messages





Figure 7. Intercepting outgoing calls

# ▼ US presidential election: Timeline of attacks during 2016



Spear-phishing email sent to John Podesta, the chairman of the 2016 Clinton presidential campaign

Additional spear-phishing emails sent to personal accounts of DNC personnel



Twitter posts used to claim intrusions were work of a lone attacker called Guccifer 2.0 and steer public attention away from Russian groups

Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC) hacked by same adversaries

Two spear-phishing campaigns conducted against political think tanks and strategy NGOs by same adversaries

Day after US election, election-themed spear-phishing emails sent to high-level targets in US federal government



MAR ..... APR ..... MAY ..... JUN ..... JUL ..... AUG ..... SEP ..... OCT ..... NOV ..... DEC



Democratic National Committee (DNC) notified by the FBI that its infrastructure had been breached


DNC identified files and malware which led it to identify two Russian groups alleged to have accessed its network

WikiLeaks released nearly 20,000 DNC emails


DNC identified intruders' access and claimed to have closed and secured its network

First dump of stolen DNC data posted online using BitTorrent

US intelligence agencies released statement they were confident that Russia directed attacks against US political groups




**Motivations Behind Attacks**  
December 2017




hackmageddon.c

**Attack Vectors**  
December 2017



hackmageddon.com

**Distribution of Targets**  
December 2017



hackmageddon.com

# General Data Protection Regulation – GDPR

**Cybercrime can no longer be considered as an acceptable 'running cost' of business**





# What do we need to protect our world ?






# What is about



- It is **acknowledged** that there is a growing need for **IT security professionals** worldwide
- To mitigate **this shortage**, many countries launch **National Cyber Security Competitions**
- The **aim** of these competitions are:
  1. Find **new** and **young talents** in **cyber security**
  2. **Encourage** young people to **pursue a career** in **cyber security**
- The **European Cyber Security Challenge – ECSC** adds a **Pan-European layer** on these **National Competitions**



# The European Cyber Security Challenge - ECSC

- It is an initiative of the **European Commission** supported by **ENISA**
- **Annually**, the competition brings together **young talents** from **European Countries** to have fun and **compete in cyber security**
- The goal of **ECSC** is to place **Cyber Security** at the **service of humankind**
- **Promoting:**
  - **An open, safe and secure cyberspace**
  - A peaceful society with democratic values
  - **Free and critical thinking**
- A **Cyber Security** championship



“

This exercise is important, not only for the participants but for the international experience they will bring back to their respective countries. This is the third year that ENISA is supporting this exercise. In those three years, we have seen the growth in the number of countries participating increase from three to 15 countries. I look forward in the next few years to the continuing expansion of this project with more people learning about the important skills involving network and information security.

”

**Prof. Dr. Udo Helmbrecht**  
**ENISA's Executive Director**

# History of the contest

## ECSC 2015

- Edition: 1st
- Place: Austria
- Participating teams: 6
- Competitors per team: 10
- Winner: Austria



## ECSC 2016

- Edition: 2nd
- Place: Germany
- Participating teams: 10
- Competitors per team: 10
- Winner: Spain





# ECSC 2017 hosted in Spain

- In 2017, the competition was hosted in **Malaga**, by **Spanish National Cyber Security Institute (INCIBE)**
- **30<sup>th</sup> October – 3<sup>rd</sup> November 2017**
- **Participated Teams: 15**
- **Competitors per Team: 10**




# National Teams that will participate



**Austria**



**Cyprus**



**Denmark**



**Estonia**




**Germany**




**Greece**




**Ireland**



**Italy**



**Liechtenstein**




**Norway**



**Romania**



**Spain**



**Switzerland**



**United Kingdom**




**Czech**

# The Hellenic Cyber Security Team 2017






# Most of the time Greece was first !!



## How satisfied were you with the design of the challenge (i.e. CTF platform)?



### 3. Campaign key statistics: what we achieved



- ENISA and INCIBE showed to be the most influential online, real AMBASSADORS of the ECSC brand
- More active participating countries



- Note that other THIRD COUNTRIES like i.e. US, China, Argentina, Canada engaged and show support of the ECSC



# Facts and figures



- In the last 10 days we had: 15,755 unique site visitors.
- In the past 30 days, ENISA's effort generated significant visibility of the ECSC2017 in the social media channels popular with the primary audience of the competition (i.e. young cyber talent)

 367  
POSTS

 184  
USERS

 379,868  
REACH

 943,324  
IMPRESSIONS

Note: Twitter impact in the past 30 days



Note: Twitter posts on #ECSC2017 in the past 30 days



## Key influencers



- Based on the analysis of social media analytics, it is evident that ENISA's support to the ECSC 2017 media campaign is instrumental for creating the impact


User	Name	Avg RTs/ Likes	Klout Score	Followers	Impressions	Total Exposure
<a href="http://twitter.com/incibe">http://twitter.com/incibe</a>	INCIBE	18,75		31691	126764	250172
<a href="http://twitter.com/enisa_eu">http://twitter.com/enisa_eu</a>	ENISA	14,27	59,24	17045	187495	388483
<a href="http://twitter.com/cybersecmonth">http://twitter.com/cybersecmonth</a>	Cyber Security Month	12,33	52,6	12651	37953	39408
<a href="http://twitter.com/ec3europol">http://twitter.com/ec3europol</a>	EC3	11	44,47	11989	11989	14604

- 3 out of 4 top impact media drivers are EU institutions (ENISA, EC3, EC – see above)

# Lessons learned - countries



- Majority of visibility and impact of ECSC 2017 campaign was reaching European countries
- Interest was triggered in other geographies too:
  - United States
  - Argentina
  - China, etc.



- Participating teams could spread the message, share and engage more.

# Funding is solely based on sponsorships

## Diamond Sponsors



UK ♦ Greece ♦ Cyprus ♦ Israel



A STAR ALLIANCE MEMBER





# Funding is solely based on sponsorships

## Platinum Sponsors



## Gold Sponsors



## Silver Sponsor



# Funding is solely based on sponsorships

## Supporters



## Equipment Supporters



## Media Sponsors




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## Η δημοσιότητα του ECSC 2017

Χρονικό διάστημα:  
Μάιος 2017-Δεκέμβριος 2017





Χρονικό διάστημα:  
Μάιος 2017-Δεκέμβριος 2017







The 2018 European Cyber Security  
Challenge will be held in London...



# 2018 Competition Dates

**October 15<sup>th</sup> – 19<sup>th</sup>  
2018**



# The Greek Participation



- The **leadership** for the **Greek participation** in **ECSC 2018** was appointed to the **Systems' Security Laboratory** of the **Department of Digital Systems** of the **University of Piraeus**
  - Constitution of the **Greek Team**
  - Organization of the **Greek participation**
  - Financial administration – Sponsorship
  - Dissemination
- The **Steering Committee** members are:
  - Prof. Christos Xenakis
  - Prof. Costas Lambrinoudakis





# The Hellenic Cybersecurity Team



- **10 Persons - Contestants**
  - Should be selected by a **National Competition**
  - **Five person (14-20)** and **five person (21 – 25)** who legally reside in **Greece**
- Three **coaches** (an additional may act as alternative) who is responsible for
  - **Well-being** and **behavior** of the **Greek Team**
  - Making sure that **essential information** reaches the **Team** and is **understood**
  - **Organizing the Team's strategy**
- **A Jury representative**
  - One from each country that assess the **performance**



# Constitution of the Greek Team

- A **National on line Competition** will take place on **April – May 2018**.
- We focus on high participation > **100 persons**.
- The Hellenic Team of 2017 will be actively involved



- Pavlos Kolios (Team leader)
- Giorgos David Tsekalis
- Anastasios Tsimpoukis
- Petros Lazaros Karolos Mantos
- Lefteris Touloumtzidis
- Giannis Zaxarioudakis
- Marios Gyftos
- Efstratios Kaplanelis
- Nikos Kamarinakis
- Fanis Dimakis



- Charis Mylonas – Greunion
- Thomas Tompoulis - Greunion
- Charis Pylarinos - Greunion
  
- Kostantinos Vavousis - Unipi
- Alexandra Dritsa – Unipi
- Stella Tsitsioulas – Red Comm

# Competition




- It will be based on the **educational exercise Capture-The-Flag (CTF)**, which gives the participants experience in:
  - **Securing a machine or an application**
  - **Conducting and reacting to attacks** found in the **real world**
- Challenges will include:
  - **Reverse engineering, network sniffing, protocol analysis**
  - **System administration, programming, cryptoanalysis**
  - **Web security, forensics, mobile security**
- In both styles: (a) **attack/defense** and (b) **Jeopardy**




# Competition - CTF

## Attack & Defense



# Competition - Isolated

## Jeopardy - Isolated





# Competition - Required skills



Operating Systems



Forensic Analysis



Web Hacking



Crypto Puzzles



Malware Analysis



Reverse Engineering



Social Engineering



Mobile Security



Esteganography



Database Security



Code Analysis



Cryptography



Secure Programming



Penetration Testing



Network Security



Miscellaneous

# Objectives for the Hellenic Team in 2018

- Attract more than **> 100 participant** at the **National Competition**
- Constitute a team of more than **> 20 persons** of the two age sets **(14- 20) & (21 – 25)**
- **Create a Hellenic Cyber Security Academy**
  - Contestants, Coaches, Supporters, Professionals, Researcher, etc.
- **Attract more Sponsors**
- **Higher impact** and **exposure** to **the media / society**
- Become more **self-funded** by providing:
  - **Professional services**
  - **Cyber training**





[www.ecsc.gr](http://www.ecsc.gr)



@ECSC2017HellenicTeam



European Cyber Security Challenge - Hellenic Team



@ECSCGR



[xenakis@unipi.gr](mailto:xenakis@unipi.gr) [stet@ssl-unipi.gr](mailto:stet@ssl-unipi.gr) [ecsc@unipi.gr](mailto:ecsc@unipi.gr)

