



### Let me tell you a story ...





#### The main character

Greek Oil Tanker company

### Situation

Malware-less attacks to capture confidential information

### **Target**

Corporate customers' information and credentials

### Challenge

Detect attacks from apparently legitimate activity

### Scenario

Data leak and compliance investigation

### Let me tell you a story ...





#### The main character

Hotel Chain in Greece

#### Situation

Access to the network through a compromised remote access tool.

### **Target**

Infect with a ransomware 500 endpoints + 60 servers

### Challenge

Detect the lateral movements and use of legitimate tools

#### Scenario

External attack + lateral movements using administrator account





#### Panda Threats Intelligence Platform <ADThreatEmailAlert@pandasecurity.com>

[Adaptive Defense 360] ] malicious program Ale 4:06 AM UTC

1 Click here to download pictures. To help protect your privacy, Outlook prevented automatic download of some pictures in this message.

Dear administrator,

Adaptive Defense 360 has detected activity by the malicious program "Trj/Genetic.gen" on computer" MAILSERVER", or 34:06 AM UTC.

Please contact our Technical Support team it you have any questions.

#### malicious program details

-MAILSERVER Computer: malicious program name: Trj/Genetic.gen

malicious program path: SYSTEMDRIVE | \ MAILSERVER.exe malicious program hash: 24481E81232380C97CEC890F5FA31B19

#### malicious program life cycle

Action Path/URL/Registry/Key	File/Hash/Registry Value	Trusted

WINDOWS | \PSEXESVC.EXE a283e768fa12ef33087f07b01f82d6dd Yes

#### Occurrences on the network

Computer	First seen		File path	
-MATERIAL-C		:55:59 AM UTC	3 SYSTEMDRIVE \.	-MATERIAL-C.exe
-SERVER		:56:37 AM UTC	3 SYSTEMDRIVE \	SERVER.exe
MGR1		:01:42 AM UTC	3 SYSTEMDRIVE \	-CR-MGR1.exe
-REC2		:54:40 AM UTC	3 SYSTEMDRIVE \ .	REC2.exe
-MGR2		:55:32 AM UTC	3 SYSTEMDRIVE \.	-MGR2.exe
DIRECTOR-2		:55:41 AM UTC	3 SYSTEMDRIVE \	``IRECTOR-2.exe
· -MAILSERVER		:55:57 AM UTC	3 SYSTEMDRIVE \c	MAILSERVER.exe
PIO-CHEF		:01:40 AM UTC	3 SYSTEMDRIVE \	-CHEF.exe
?_FR Δ \$ \$		·54·47 AM LITC	3 L SYSTEMDRIVE I \ C -	· '- '- PA A S S A Y A



### The purpose of this malware


At first sight the malware seems that it did not perform any malicious activities on the machine.

But the malware managed to configure a Registry entry that will load malware in the startup of the machine

This malware will encrypt the machine in the next startup. Adaptive Defense 360 has detected activity by the malicious program "Trj/Genetic.gen" on computer " 12:09:51 PM UTC. Please contact our Technical Support team if you have any questions. malicious proaram details Computer: malicious program name: Trj/Genetic.gen malicious program path: APPDATA I \usercache\svchost.exe malicious program hash: 24481E81232380C97CEC890F5FA31B19 malicious program life cycle Date Action Path/URL/Registry/Key File/Hash/Registry Value Trusted \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-2073749359-4067451734-Modifies registry key to 257756863-31 APPDATA I \usercache\svchost.exe Null point to an exe 500\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run? svchost Has a thread SYSTEM | \rundli32.exe dd81d91ff3b0763c392422865c9ac12e Yes injected by ommunicates 190.97.166.61:80 TCP-Download Null \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-2073749359-4067451734registry key to 257756863-3 | APPDATA | \usercache\svchost.exe Null point to an exe 500\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run? svchost

### Let me tell you a story ...





### The main character

Supermarket chains in Greece.

#### Situation

Compromised Remote desktop that was exposed on the internet.

### **Target**

Encrypt customer data and request ransom

### Challenge

Detect the origin of the attack

### Scenario

Incident investigation + Threat Hunting



### Every organization, regardless of size, has the same security aspirations.



## "Attackers can't be stopped"

Dedicated nation-state attacks are persistent

Adversaries and malware <u>can</u> be stopped Using basic defensive steps that are already available



# "All attackers are geniuses"

Attackers are average (Electricians, not Einstein)

Use tools passed on from others

Brilliant hackers are few and far between



### "IT Security knows what to do"

IT Security teams are full of intelligent, hardworking people

Lacking real data to back up beliefs about problems

Individuals driven by preference, not organizational priority



### "Patching is under control"

100,000s of programs with undiscovered bugs

10 to 20 unpatched programs represent the majority of risk

Hardware, firmware, and drivers are frequently missed



# In most cases, "successful" attacks are on the endpoint or user.



# BUT - It is no longer just about "bad file" v "good file" decisions.



### Infections are Dwindling



### Hackers are the new problem

- Trained by governments, security companies, and criminal organizations
- Create targeted attacks with proprietary malware
- Using applications and goodware to fly under the radar
- An equivalent response to this is needed

- Only hackers represent a challenge
- · When they are on the network with admin credentials



# Aside from using EPP, EDR to detect the known knowns or unknown we need to change our way of thinking ...






### **What is Threat Hunting**

"...the process of **proactively** and iteratively searching through networks to detect and isolate advanced threats that evade existing security solutions."

This is in contrast to traditional threat management measures, such as firewalls, intrusion detection systems (IDS), malware sandbox (computer security) and SIEM systems, which typically involve an investigation

**After** there has been a warning of a potential threat or an incident has occurred."





# What Is NOT Threat Hunting

- It is not better alert triage (very much still "gathering!"):
  - o ... and neither is "much better/faster alert triage"
- It is not using endpoint detection and response (EDR) to match threat intel/indicators in your systems:
  - This may form part of the hunt, this is IoC search and should be automated.
- It is not searching for things in a security data lake:
  - Again, you may search data during the hunt, but this is still loC searching.
- It is not a replacement for threat detection.



### Threat Detection vs. **Threat Hunting**

#### **Threat Detection**

**Deploy detection** content (rules, algorithms)

Receive alerts when conditions match

**Triage alerts** 

Respond to an incident

#### **Threat Hunting**

**Formulate** a hypothesis

Look for it in the environment

> If not proven, go back

If proven, pivot and expand the scope; follow the hunting process

Respond to an incident

**Develop new** detection content





# Threat Hunting Prerequisites

People — since Threat Hunting is analyst-centric, need strong threat analysts and "tribal" knowledge

Process — Threat Hunting is ad hoc, but there is a method to this madness

**Technology** — naturally, you need the [data] "pond" to hunt with; visibility tools are essential!



# Limited staffing, limited expertise, and the number of threats, attacks and breaches continue to grow...

### So what can we do?




Mainstream organizations start to look for these Features-as-a-Service to address threat detection and response.

.. AND ...

Mainstream organizations start to streamline their security and IT operations workflow.





# Visit out booth, to discuss further!



### Thank You!

